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Abstract
In this work, we present a new planning formalism called
Expectation-Aware planning for decision making with hu-
mans in the loop where the human’s expectations about an
agent may differ from the agent’s own model. We show how
this formulation allows agents to not only leverage existing
strategies for handling model differences but can also ex-
hibit novel behaviors that are generated through the combi-
nation of these different strategies. Our formulation also re-
veals a deep connection to existing approaches in epistemic
planning. Specifically, we show how we can leverage clas-
sical planning compilations for epistemic planning to solve
Expectation-Aware planning problems. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposed formulation is the first complete so-
lution to decision-making in the presence of diverging user
expectations that is amenable to a classical planning compi-
lation while successfully combining previous works on ex-
planation and explicability. We empirically show how our ap-
proach provides a computational advantage over existing ap-
proximate approaches that unnecessarily try to search in the
space of models while also failing to facilitate the full gamut
of behaviors enabled by our framework.
Introduction
One of the greatest challenges in designing agents that can
work with humans is in making sure that the agents are ca-
pable of acting in a manner that is interpretable to the hu-
mans. A major barrier towards achieving fluent collabora-
tion occurs when the human’s expectations regarding the
agent’s capabilities and preferences differ from reality. Such
knowledge asymmetry implies that even in cases where the
agent is coming up with the best decisions it can, the human
would not be able to agree to the quality of that plan. Pre-
vious works have proposed two strategies to handle this: (1)
provide information that reconciles the model differences,
either through explicit communication (Chakraborti et al.
2017) or by performing actions that convey robots capabil-
ities (Kwon et al. 2018) (2) or by acting in a manner that
aligns with human expectations (Zhang et al. 2017).
While each of these are reasonable strategies on their own,
for the agent to be truly effective we would want it to be ca-
pable of combining the strengths of each. Unfortunately, cur-
rent approaches to combining these methods (for example
(Chakraborti et al. 2019b)) have generally fallen short in the
kind of behavior they can generate. We are unaware of any
existing works that is truly able to capitalize on the agent’s
ability to effect and leverage human expectations through
explicit communication and behavior.
Our formulation, on the other hand, leads to what may
be best described as self-explaining plans with the plan now
containing actions that are responsible for explaining the rest
of the plan. Such explanations may be delivered by purely
communicative actions (thereby capturing (Chakraborti et
al. 2017)) that are meant to update the human’s mental
model or task level actions that could also have epistemic
side effects (thereby allowing for actions of the type stud-
ied in (Kwon et al. 2018)). Additionally, the framework al-
lows for selecting plans that aligns with human expectations
whenever possible. Our contributions are thus two-fold:
- We present the first unification of various threads of plan-
ning with differing human expectation: including acting
in-accordance with the human expectation (explicability),
bridging model asymmetry through implicit (epistemic
effects of plan execution on the mental model) and ex-
plicit communication (explanations).
- We show how our formulation is complete (unlike previ-
ous approaches) while also lending itself to a compilation
to classical planning problems. The latter provides sig-
nificant computational advantage with respect to existing
algorithms in this space that search directly in the space
of models.
Background
We will assume that the planning models used by both
the human and the robot are represented as classical plan-
ning problems described by the tupleM = 〈F,A, I,G,C〉
(Geffner and Bonet 2013), where F is the set of proposi-
tional fluents used to describe the planning task states, A
the set of actions, I the initial state, G the goal. Each action
a ∈ A is further defined as a tuple a = 〈preca, addsa, delsa〉,
where preca is its preconditions, and addsa and delsa are its
add and delete effects. The precondition is a propositional
formula defined over state fluents such that an action a can
only be executed in a state S if S |= preca. The effects are
generally of the form c → e, where the antecedent repre-
sents the condition under which the effect e should be ap-
plied (where the fluent corresponding to e is set to true in
the state if c→ e is part of the add effects, and if it is part of
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the delete it is set to false).
Each action is associated with a cost C(a). A plan or a
sequence of actions pi = 〈a1, ..., an〉 is a valid solution of
a planning problem M if pi(I) |=M G and G ⊆ pi(I).
The cost of a plan is the sum of individual action costs, i.e.
C(pi) =
∑n
i=1 C(ai). A plan pi is said to be optimal if there
exist no valid plan pi′ such that C(pi′) < CM(pi). We will
use Π∗M to represent the set of all optimal plans forM.
The particular setting we are interested in involves an
agent that makes decisions using its own model MR =
〈F,AR, IR, GR, C〉 while a human evaluates the plan using
their mental modelMH = 〈F,AH , IH , GH , C〉. For ease of
discussion, we concentrate on the specific case where condi-
tions for actions only consist of conjunction of positive lit-
erals and the agents have the same cost. While the human is
under the assumption that MH is an accurate representation
of the task at hand, the model could be different fromMR in
terms of action definitions, the initial state, and the goal. This
difference means that plans generated for the model MR
may have different properties in the mental modelMH . For
example, a plan pi∗ that is optimal inMR may be considered
suboptimal or even in-executable by the human.
When model asymmetry becomes a source of confusion
for the observer, explaining the plan must involve bridging
this gap. One of the ideas proposed by earlier works in ex-
planations as model reconciliation (c.f (Chakraborti et al.
2017)) is that given a specific plan, the agent does not need
to achieve complete reconciliation. Rather they can focus
on providing enough information that the current plan has
required properties (such as executability, optimality, etc.).
When the agent is aware of MH , it can use this knowledge
to figure out the minimal (where minimality of explanations
defined with respect to an explanation cost CE) information
it needs to provide to achieve the required properties. For
example, the problem of identifying explanations for estab-
lishing optimality of a given plan pi thus becomes:
argminE(CE(E))
such that pi ∈ Π∗MH+E
where E is a set of model information about the agent to
be provided to the user as explanation (this could include
truth value of fluents in initial state, presence or absence of
literals in preconditions/effects, etc.) andMH +E is the up-
dated user model after the explanation. Note that our use of
‘+’ operator does not imply that all model reconciliation ex-
planations are additive as E could include information aimed
at correcting user’s misconceptions about additional effects
or even additional actions that the robot is capable of. We
will follow the conventions set by (Chakraborti et al. 2017)
and will focus on three main types of model updates:
(1) Turn a fluent p true or false in initial state (represented
by the operator {add/remove}-p-from-I)
(2) Add or remove a fluent p from the precondition (also
add or delete effect) list of an action a (represented by the
operator {add/remove}-p-from-{prec/adds/dels}-of-a)
(3) Add or remove a fluent p from the goal list (represented
by the operator {add/remove}-p-from-G)
This focuses on cases where the agent is explaining its
plan to the human after generating it. The flip side would be
to try generating plans that are tailored for the human model.
This is referred to as explicable planning and the most basic
version of this problem can be formulated as:
argminpi(C(pi))
Such that pi(IR) |= GR and pi(IH) |= GH
This computes a plan that is executable in the agent and hu-
man mental model with the lowest cost. Our approach is ca-
pable of both explaining its plans as well as choosing plans
that align with the user expectations. Before delving into
details of the formulation, let us introduce the search and
rescue domain (a variation from (Chakraborti et al. 2019b))
which we will use as an illustrative example for the rest of
the paper.
Running Example: Search & Rescue
A typical Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) scenario con-
sists of an autonomous robot deployed to a disaster scene
with an external commander who is monitoring its activi-
ties. Both agents start with the same model of the world (i.e
the map of the building before the disaster) but the models
diverge over time since the robot, being internal to the scene,
has access to updated information about the building. This
model divergence could lead to the commander incorrectly
evaluating valid plans from the robot as sub-optimal or even
unsafe. One way to satisfy the commander would be to com-
municate or explain changes to the model that led the robot
to come up with those plans in the first place.
Figure 1 illustrates a scenario where the robot needs to
travel from P1 to its goal at P17. The optimal plan expected
by the commander is highlighted in grey in their map and
involves the robot moving through waypoint P7 and follow
that corridor to go to P15 and then finally to P16. The robot
knows that it should in fact be moving to P2 – its optimal
plan is highlighted in blue. This disagreement rises from the
fact that the human incorrectly believes that the path from
P16 to P17 is clear while that from P2 to P3 is blocked.
If the robot were to follow the explanation scheme estab-
lished in (Chakraborti et al. 2017), it would stick to its own
plan and provide the following explanation:
> remove- ( c l e a r p16 p17 ) -from- I
( i . e . Pa th from P16 t o P17 i s b l o c k e d )
> add- ( c l e a r p2 p3 ) - t o - I
( i . e . Pa th from P2 t o P3 i s c l e a r )
If the robot were to stick to a purely explicable plan
(Zhang et al. 2017) then it can choose to use the passage
through P5 and P6 after performing a costly clear passage
action (this plan is not optimal in either of the models).
Expectation-Aware Planning
We call the task of computing plans with the expectations of
an external agent: Expectation-Aware planning.
Definition 1. A Expectation-Aware planning problem (EA)
is defined by the tuple Ψ = 〈MR,MH〉, whereMR is the
robot model andMH is the model ascribed to the robot by
Figure 1: The basic robot and human maps. The robot starts at P1 and needs to go to P17. The human incorrectly believes that the path from
P16 to P17 is clear and the one from P2 to P3 is blocked by fire. Both agents know that there are some movable rubble between p5 and P6
that can be cleared with the help of a costly clear passage action. Finally in the human model the door at P8 is locked while it is unlocked in
the robot model and robot can’t open unlocked doors.
an observer. A solution to the problem Ψ is then given by
the tuple 〈EΨ, piΨ〉, where EΨ is set of model updates for
MH consistent withMR and piΨ a plan. The given solution
is considered valid iff piΨ(IMR) |=MR GMR (it is valid
in the agent model) as well as piΨ(IMH+EΨ)) |=MH+EΨ
GMH+EΨ (valid in the updated mental model).
This means that a solution to an expectation aware prob-
lem may consist of model information to be provided to the
observer along with the plan that needs to be followed by the
agent. In the USAR example, the optimal robot plan along
with the two initial state updates, and the explicable plan
with no model updates, would both be valid solutions.
While at first glance, the need to keep track of both models
and identifying the model changes may make the problem of
solving EA planning problems considerably harder than the
original decision making problem. However, we show that,
in fact, finding a valid solution in this setting is no harder
than identifying valid plans for classical planning problems:
Theorem 1. For a given EA problem Ψ = 〈MR,MH〉,
where bothMR andMH are represented as classical plan-
ning problems, the problem of identifying a valid solution
for Ψ is PSPACE-complete.
Proof Sketch. The PSPACE-hardness of an EA is easy to es-
tablish since the problem of planning with just agent model
can be mapped to a specific EA planning scenario where
both agent and user have the same model. We can estab-
lish membership in PSPACE class by showing that there ex-
ist a sound and complete compilation from EA to a plan-
ning problem with conditional effects and disjunctive/nega-
tive preconditions that is linear in size of the original plan-
ning problems. We can then follow the same proof specified
in (Bylander 1994) to show that the problem of plan exis-
tence is still in PSPACE for this class of planning problems.
The exact details of the compilation along with the sound-
ness and completeness proofs will be discussed in Section
.
Self-Explaining Plans as Solutions to EA
One of the main challenges of compiling an EA problem to a
traditional planning problems is to allow for a way to handle
the identification of model updates and to account for the
effect of these model updates on the user’s expectation. A
good way to go about this would be by acknowledging that
that if the observer is actually watching the agent executing
a plan, these explanations can delivered through and hence
modeled as communicative or explanatory actions. These
actions can, in fact, be seen as actions with epistemic ef-
fects in as much as they are aimed towards modifying the
human mental model. This means that a solution to an EA
planning problem can be seen as self-explaining plans, in
the sense that some of the actions in the plan are aimed at
helping people better understand the rest of the plan.
This puts EA planning squarely in the purview of epis-
temic planning, but the additional constraints enforced by
the setting allow us to leverage relatively efficient meth-
ods to solve the problem at hand. These constraints include
facts like: all epistemic actions are public, modal depth is re-
stricted to one, modal operators only applied to literals, for
any literal the observer believes it to be true or false and the
robot is fully aware of all of the observer beliefs.
Model updates in the form of epistemic effects of commu-
nication actions also open up the possibility of other actions
having epistemic side effects. The definition of EA makes no
claims as to how the model update information is delivered.
It is quite possible that actions that the agent is performing to
achieve the goal (henceforth referred to as task-level actions
to differentiate it from primary epistemic communication ac-
tions) itself could have epistemic side-effects. This is some-
thing people leverage to simplify communication – e.g. one
might avoid providing prior description of some skill they
are about to use when they can simply demonstrate it. So
one of our goals with the compilation is to allow for such
epistemic side effects; a factor that has previously been not
considered in any of the earlier works. This consideration
also enables us to also capture task level constraints that may
be imposed on the communication actions.
Compilation to classical planning. To support such self-
explaining plans, we adopt a formulation that is similar to
the one introduced in (Muise et al. 2015) to compile reason-
ing about epistemic states into a classical planning problem.
In our setting, each explanatory action can be viewed as an
action with epistemic effects. One interesting distinction to
make here is that the mental model now not only includes the
human’s belief about the task state but also their belief about
the robot’s model. This means that the planning model will
need to separately keep track of (1) the current robot state,
(2) the human’s belief regarding the current state, (3) how
actions would effect each of these (as humans may have dif-
fering expectations about the effects of each action) and (4)
how those expectations change with explanations.
Given the model reconciliation planning problem Ψ =
〈MR,MH〉, we will generate a new planning modelMΨ =
〈FΨ, AΨ, IΨ, GΨ, CΨ〉 as follows FΨ = F ∪ FB ∪ Fµ ∪
{G, I}, where FB is a set of new fluents that will be used to
capture the human’s belief about the task state and Fµ is a
set of meta fluents that we will use to capture the effects of
explanatory actions and G and I are special goal and initial
state propositions. We will use the notation B(p) to capture
the human’s belief about the fluent p. We are able to use
a single fluent to capture the human belief for each (as op-
posed to introducing two new fluents B(p) and B(¬p)) as we
are specifically dealing with a scenario where the human’s
belief about the robot model is fully known and human ei-
ther believes each of the fluent to be true or false. In this
case, we also do not require any of the additional rules that
were employed in (Muise et al. 2015) to ensure that the state
captures the deductive closure of the agent beliefs.
Fµ will contain an element for every part of the human
model that can be changed by the robot through explana-
tions. A meta fluent corresponding to a literal φ from the
precondition of an action a takes the form of µ+(φprec
a
),
where the superscript + refers to the fact that the clause φ is
part the precondition of the action a in the robot model (for
cases where the fluent represents an incorrect human belief
we will be using the superscript −).
For every action a = 〈preca, addsa, delsa〉 ∈ AR and its
human counterpart ah = 〈precah , addsah , delsah〉 ∈ AH ,
we define a new action aΨ = 〈precaΨ , addsaΨ , delsaΨ〉 ∈
MΨ whose precondition is given as:
precaΨ = precaR∪{µ+(φpreca)→ B(φ)|φ ∈ precaR\precaH}
∪ {µ−(φpreca)→ B(φ)|φ ∈ precaH \ precaR}
∪ {B(φ)|φ ∈ precaH ∩ precaR}
The important point to note here is that at any given state, an
action in the augmented model is only applicable if the ac-
tion is executable in robot model and the human believes the
action to be executable. Unlike the executability of the ac-
tion in the robot model (captured through unconditional pre-
conditions) the human’s beliefs about the action executabil-
ity can be manipulated by turning the meta fluents on and
off. The effects of these actions can also be defined simi-
larly by conditioning them on the relevant meta fluent. In
addition to these task level actions (represented by the set
Aτ ), we can also define explanatory actions (Aµ) that either
add µ+(∗) fluents or delete µ−(∗).
Special actions a0 and a∞ that are responsible for setting
all the initial state conditions true and checking the goal con-
ditions are also added into the domain model. a0 has a single
precondition that checks for I and has the following add and
delete effects:
addsa0 = {> → p | p ∈ IR} ∪ {> → B(p) | p ∈ IH}
∪ {> → p | p ∈ Fµ−}
delsa0 = {I}
where Fµ− is the subset of Fµ that consists of all the fluents
of the form µ−(∗). Similarly, the precondition of action a∞
is set using the original goal and adds the proposition G.
preca∞ = GR ∪ {µ+(pG)→ B(p) | p ∈ GR \GH}∪
{µ−(pG)→ B(p) | p ∈ GH \GR}∪ {B(p) | GH ∩GR}
Finally the new initial state and the goal specification be-
comes IE = {I} and GE = {G} respectively. To see how
such a compilation would look in practice, consider an ac-
tion (move from p1 p2) that allows the robot to move from
point p1 to p2 only if the path is clear. The action is defined
as follows in the robot model:
( : a c t i o n move from p1 p2
: p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and ( a t p 1 ) ( c l e a r p 1 p 2 ) )
: e f f e c t ( and ( n o t ( a t p 1 ) ) ( a t p 2 ) ) )
Let us assume the human is aware of this action but does
not care about the status of the path (as they assume the robot
can move through any debris filled path). In this case, the
corresponding action in the augmented model and the rele-
vant explanatory action will be:
( : a c t i o n move from p1 p2
: p r e c o n d i t i o n
( and ( a t p 1 ) (B ( ( a t p 1 ) ) ) ( c l e a r p 1 p 2 )
( i m p l i e s
(µ+prec ( move from p1 p2 , ( c l e a r p 1 p 2 ) ) )
(B ( ( c l e a r p 1 p 2 ) ) ) ) )
: e f f e c t ( and ( n o t ( a t p 1 ) ) ( a t p 2 )
( n o t B ( a t p 1 ) ) B ( a t p 2 ) ) ) )
( : a c t i o n e x p l a i n µ+prec m o v e f r o m c l e a r
: p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and )
: e f f e c t ( and µ+prec ( move from p1 p2 ,
( c l e a r p 1 p 2 ) ) ) )
Finally CΨ captures the cost of all explanatory and task
level actions. For now we will assume that the cost of task-
level actions are set to the original action cost in either robot
or human model and the explanatory action costs are set ac-
cording to CE . Later, we will discuss how we can adjust the
explanatory action costs to generate desired behavior.
We will refer to an augmented model that contains an ex-
planatory action for each possible model updates and has no
actions with effects on both the human’s mental model and
the task level states as the canonical augmented model.
Given an augmented model, let piE be a plan that is valid
for this model (piE(IΨ) ⊆ GΨ). From piE , we extract two
types of information – the model updates induced by the ac-
tions in the plan (represented as E(piE)) and the sequence of
actions that have some effect of the task state represented as
D(piE) (we refer to the output of D as the task level frag-
ment of the original plan piE)). E(piE) may contain effects
from action in D(piE). This brings us to our next theorem.
Theorem 2. For a given EA problem Ψ = 〈MR,MH〉 the
corresponding augmented modelMΨ is a sound and com-
plete formulation: (1) for every valid pi for MΨ the tuple
〈E(pi),D(pi)〉 is a valid solution for Ψ and (2) for every valid
solution 〈EΨ, pi〉, there exists a corresponding valid plan for
pi′ forMΨ such that D(pi′) = pi and E(pi′) = EΨ.
The proof sketch is included in the supplementary file.
The planner can automatically find positions of the ex-
planatory actions, but to avoid any confusion that may arise
from belief revisions on the users’ end, we can enforce some
common sense ordering like making any explanation related
to an action to appear before the first instance of that ac-
tion. This ordering will make sure that users are not confused
about earlier action effects and also helps reduce branching,
making planning more efficient.
Stage of Interaction and Epistemic Side Effects: One of
the important parameters of the problem setting that we have
yet to discuss is whether the explanation is meant for a plan
that is proposed by the system (i.e the system presents a se-
quence of actions to the user) or are we explaining some plan
that is being executed either in the real world or some sim-
ulation the user (observer) has access to. Even though the
above formulation can be directly used for both scenarios,
we can use the fact that the human is observing the exe-
cution of the plans to simplify the explanatory behavior by
leveraging the fact that many of these actions may have epis-
temic side effects. This allows us to not explain any of the
effects of the actions that the human can observe (for those
effects we can directly update the believed value of the cor-
responding state fluent and the meta-fluent).1 This is beyond
the capability of any of the existing algorithms in this space
of the explicability-explanation dichotomy.
This consideration also allows for the incorporation of
more complicated epistemic side-effects wherein the user
may infer facts about the task that may not be directly tied
to the effects of actions. Such effects may be specified by
domain experts or generated using heuristics. Once identi-
fied, adding them to the model is relatively straightforward
as we can directly add the corresponding meta fluent into
the effects of the relevant action. An example for a sim-
ple heuristic would be to assume that the firing of a con-
ditional effect results in the human believing the condition
to be true. For example, if we assume that the robot had an
action (open door d1 p3) that had a conditional effect:
( when ( and ( u n l o c k e d d 1 ) ) ( open d1 ) )
Then in the compiled model, we can add a new effect:
1This means that when the plan is being executed, the prob-
lem definition should include the observation model of the human
(which we assume to be deterministic). To keep the formulation
simple, we ignore this for now. Including this additional consider-
ation is straightforward for deterministic sensor models.
( when ( and ( u n l o c k e d d 1 ) )
( and B ( open d1 ) B ( u n l o c k e d d 1 ) ) )
Even in this simple case, it may be useful to restrict the
rule to cases where the effect is conditioned on previously
unused fluents so the robot does not expect the observer to
be capable of regressing over the entire plan.
Optimality of the Agent
The compilation explored so far only takes into considera-
tion the expectations the agent has about the safety of the
plans (i.e the user would expect any plans generated to be
valid and executable) and does not account for the user’s ex-
pectation on whether the agent should act optimally. In the
earlier example, if the agent just followed the plan that takes
the robot through P5 and P6 with a clear passage P5 P6
action with no additional explanatory actions then the user
may still be confused why the agent does not just follow the
plan that involves going through P16 to P17 that it believes
to be cheaper (marked in grey in the human’s map).
Even in cases where the action costs are the same for
the agent and the human, we cannot account for such ex-
pectations by merely generating optimal plans in the aug-
mented model. For example, the optimal plan in the aug-
mented model would be the one through P2 and P3 (the
full plan is marked in blue in the robot map) with one extra
explanatory action explain µ+I clear P2 P3. While the above
plan provides an explanation to ensure validity, ensuring the
optimality of the resultant plan would require the agent to
also explain that the passage from P16 to P17 is blocked,
which would clearly be more expensive than choosing the
valid plan for any non-zero cost for explanatory actions.
This means that in order to accommodate such consider-
ations we need to go beyond the compilation discussed so
far. One approach would be to prune all solutions where the
task level fragment of the plan (D(pi)) is suboptimal in the
updated human model. A simple way to enforce this would
be to extend the planner to perform an optimality test for the
current plan during the goal test. It may be possible to use
more intelligent pruning to reduce the number of goal tests
(e.g. one could leverage the fact that the optimality test never
needs to be repeated for the same set of model updates) and
we could design heuristics that take into account optimality
aspects. In this paper, we adopt this simple approach as a
first step towards modeling these novel behaviors.
Balanced Plans vs. Agent Optimal Plans
Even when generating plans that preserve the user’s expec-
tations about agent optimality, the agent could generate two
types of plans: agent optimal plans (Chakraborti et al. 2017)
or balanced plans (Chakraborti et al. 2019b). In the first
scheme, the agent chooses to select self-explanatory plans
whose task level fragment is going to be optimal in the orig-
inal agent model and then choose the minimal explanations
that justifies the optimality plan (i.e the plan is optimal in the
user’s updated model). Such explanations are referred to as
Minimally Complete Explanation or MCE (the agent could
also choose among the optimal plans the one that requires
the cheapest MCE). An example would be choosing the plan
New Compilation Model Space Search
coverage runtime coverage runtime
Blocksworld 13/15 569.38 13/15 2318.73
Elevator 15/15 59.20 1/15 3382.462
Gripper 5/15 2301.90 6/15 2093.54
Driverlog 4/15 2740.38 2/15 3158.59
Satellite 2/15 3186.93 0/15 3600
Table 1: Coverage and average runtime (sec) for explanations gen-
erated for a few standard IPC domains.
highlighted in blue in robot model and then explaining that
the P2 to P3 is clear and P16 to P17 is blocked. In the lat-
ter scheme, the agent could choose plans that are easiest to
explain (here again we need to ensure that after the explana-
tion the plan is optimal in the updated model). For example,
in the USAR scenario if communication is expensive, it may
be easier to choose the plan to move through P5 and P6 with
a clear passage action since we only need to explain that the
passage P16 to P17 is blocked.
In the first case, the agent is effectively prioritizing any
loss of optimality over any overhead accrued by communi-
cating the explanation, while in the latter case the agent ac-
counts for the cost of both the plan it is performing and the
explanation cost (the cost of communication and possibly
the computational overhead experienced by the user on re-
ceiving the explanation). By assigning explanatory costs to
explanatory actions we are essentially generating balanced
plans but there may be scenarios where the agent needs to
stick to its optimal plan. We can generate such agent opti-
mal plans by setting lower explanatory action costs. Before
we formally state the bounds for explanatory costs, let us de-
fine the concept of optimality delta (denoted as ∆piM) for a
planning model, which captures the cost difference between
the optimal plan and the second most optimal plan. More
formally ∆piM can be specified as:
∆piM = max{v | v ∈ R∧ 6 ∃pi1, pi2((0 < (C(pi1)−C(pi2)) < v)
∧ pi1(IM) |=M GM ∧ pi2(IM) ∈ Π∗M}
Theorem 3. In a canonical augmented model MΨ for an
EA planning problem Ψ, if the sum of costs of all explana-
tory actions is ≤ ∆piMR and if pi is the cheapest valid plan
forMΨ such that D(pi) ∈ Π∗MΨ+E(pi), then:
(1) D(pi) is optimal forMR
(2) E(pi) is the MCE for D(pi)
(3) There exists no plan pˆi ∈ Π∗R such that MCE for D(pˆi)
is cheaper than E(pi), i.e. the search will find an the plan
with the smallest MCE.
The proof is included in the supplementary file. Note that
while it is hard to find the exact value of the optimality
∆piM, it is guaranteed to be ≥ 1 for domains with only
unit cost actions or ≥ (C2 − C1), where C1 is the cost of
the cheapest action and C2 is the cost of the second cheapest
action, i.e. ∀a(CM(a) < C2 → CM(a) = C1). Thus al-
lowing us to easily scale the cost of the explanatory actions
to meet this criteria.
Evaluation
Since the nature of our solution has already been validated
in literature through human factors evaluation – model rec-
onciliation explanation has been studied in (Chakraborti et
al. 2019a), balanced plans in (Chakraborti et al. 2019b), ex-
plicable plans in (Zhang et al. 2017; Kulkarni et al. 2019),
and the use of physical actions to communicate robot model
information in (Kwon et al. 2018) – we will focus on demon-
strating the generality of our framework and studying empir-
ically the performance of the compilation.
Illustrative Example of Cost-Tradeoff
We start by demonstrating how our approach can lead to
different solution by altering various costs associated with
agent actions. Consider again the USAR domain described
earlier: the models for the robot and the user is provided
in the supplementary (the action for opening a door has an
epistemic side effect that the observer would know that the
door is unlocked). We start by assigning a cost of 10 to every
robot action other than clear-rubble action (which is 50) and
the move-through-door action (set to 20). We set the cost of
communication action to 1 to start with. The solution pro-
duced corresponds to the blue plan in Figure 1.
e x p l a i n s µ+init c l e a r p 2 p 3−>
e x p l a i n s µ−init c l e a r p 1 6 p 1 7−>
move p1 p2−> move p2 p3−> move p3 p4−>
move p4 p11−>move p11 p13−> move p13 p14
−> move p14 p18−> move p18 p17
This plan includes the optimal robot plan and corre-
sponding MCE. Now if we were to set the cost of commu-
nication actions to 100, we see the agent deviating to plans
which on their own may not be optimal – e.g. a plan that
involves opening the door at P8:
e x p l a i n s µ−init c l e a r p 1 6 p 1 7−>
move p1 p7−> move p7 p8−> opendoor p8 d1−>
move th roughdoor p8 p9 d1−> move p9 p10−>
move p10 p13−> move p13 p14−> move p14 p18−>
move p18 p17
Here the robot does not have to explicitly provide a sepa-
rate explanation for the status of the door, but still needs to
explain that the path from P15 to P16 is blocked. Note that
this plan is an example of a balanced plan that leverages
epistemic side effects.
Now we go one step further and relax the need to assure
optimality of the plan in the human model from a hard con-
straint to just a penalty (details of this extension are part
of the supplementary). This gets us the exact same plan as
above but without the explanation about the blocked corridor
from P15 to P16, thus allowing a notion of soft explicability.
Runtime Complexity
Next we establish how our approach compares in terms of
runtime to previous work. In particular, we will use as ref-
erence the optimistic and approximate version of the bal-
ancing approach in (Chakraborti et al. 2019b) that identifies
only one optimal plan per search node and the search ends as
soon as it finds a node where the optimal plan produced has
the same cost as the robot plan and is executable in the robot
model. This means all the solutions we generate are guaran-
teed to be better (in terms of cost) than that generated by the
other. For comparison, we selected five IPC domains and for
each domain, we created three unique models by introduc-
ing 10 random updates in the model, except in the case of
Gripper and Driverlog where only 5 were removed. Each of
these five domains were paired with five problem instances
and then tested on each of the possible configurations. Each
instance was run with a limit of 30 minutes, all explanatory
actions were restricted to the beginning of the plan and the
cost of explanatory actions were set to be twice the cost of
original action. Figure 1 lists the time taken to solve each
of these problems. For calculating the average runtime, we
used 1800 secs as the stand in for the runtime of all the in-
stances that timed out. We used h max (admissible) as the
heuristic for all the configurations.
As clearly apparent from the table, the new approach does
better than the original method for generating balanced plans
for most of the domains. Gripper seems to be the only do-
main, where model search seem to be doing slightly better
but this is also a domain that had the smallest number of
model differences. This indicates that the ability to lever-
age planning heuristics can make a marked difference in do-
mains with a large number of explanatory actions.
Related Work
We end with a review of existing literature and emphasize
key differentiators with the proposed work.
Epistemic Planning It is well understood in social sci-
ences that explanations must be generated while keeping
in mind the beliefs of the agent receiving the explanation
(Miller 2018). As such, epistemic planning makes for an
excellent framework for studying the problem of generat-
ing these explanations. While the most general formula-
tion of epistemic planning has been shown to be undecid-
able, many simpler fragments have been identified (Bolan-
der et al. 2015). In human-aware planning settings too,
there has been increasing consensus that epistemic plan-
ning could be an extremely useful tool. Readers can re-
fer to (Miller 2017) for an overview of works done in em-
ploying epistemic planning for “social planning”. Recently,
there have been a lot of interest in developing efficient
methods for planning in such settings (Muise et al. 2015;
Kominis and Geffner 2015; Kominis and Geffner 2017;
Le et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2018).
Model Reconciliation Among the works related to model
reconciliation, the work that is most closely connected to
ours is (Chakraborti et al. 2019b). The idea of balanced
plans were first proposed in that work. Unfortunately, the
actual algorithm they study is incomplete and is not guaran-
teed to produce the least expensive balanced plan. Even the
complete version they hypothesize in their paper relies enu-
merating all the possible optimal plans for a given updated
model, which can be extremely inefficient, particularly since
they expect to perform this for every possible model in the
model space. As we see in the empirical evaluations, our
method (which is also complete) is often faster against their
optimistic approximate version. Moreover the methods dis-
cussed in that paper are unable to utilize task-level actions
with epistemic side effect or take into account task level con-
straints for purely communicative actions and the effects of
execution on an observer, as we illustrate through examples.
Communicative Actions Our work also looks at the use
of explanatory actions as a means of communicating in-
formation to the human observer. The most obvious types
of such explanatory action includes purely communicative
actions such as speech (Tellex et al. 2014) or the use of
mixed reality projections (Chakraborti et al. 2018; Ganesan
2017). Recent works have shown that physical agents could
also use movements to relay information such as intention
(MacNally et al. 2018; Dragan et al. 2013) and incapabil-
ity (Kwon et al. 2018). Our framework allows for a natural
trade-off between these different types of communication.
Contrastive Explanations and Inferential Capabilities
Many recent works dealing with explanation generation for
planning have looked at characterizing explanations in terms
of the types of questions they answer (Fox et al. 2017;
Smith 2012). This characterization is orthogonal to the ques-
tion of what type of information constitutes valid explana-
tions. Putting aside questions regarding observability, the
reason why a user may request an explanation is either due
to knowledge mismatch (incomplete or incorrect knowledge
of the task) or due to limitations of their inferential capa-
bilities. The answer to any of these questions would require
correcting the human’s model of the task and/or providing
inferential assistance. Works that have looked at model rec-
onciliation explanations have mostly focused on the former.
Explanations discussed in this paper can be viewed as an
answer to the question “Why this plan?” (which can also be
viewed as a contrastive question of the form “Why this plan
and not any other plan?”). This is not to say that in complex
scenarios just the model reconciliation information would
suffice, but it would need to be supplemented with informa-
tion internal to the model that can address the differences in
inferential capabilities. Use of abstractions (Sreedharan et
al. 2018), providing refutation of specific foils (Sreedharan
et al. 2018) and providing causal explanations (Seegebarth
et al. 2012) could be used to augment model reconciliation.
Conclusion
The paper presents a unifying formulation for the task of
planning in the presence of users with incorrect mental mod-
els. The formulation allows us to unify, for the first time,
explanatory and explicable paradigms into a single frame-
work that is still amenable to classical planning. We discuss
how this formulation can be extended to capture novel ex-
planatory behaviors hitherto unexplored in literature while
being computationally more efficient than methods that rely
on direct model space search. One of the exciting features
of our work is that we are able to place Expectation-Aware
within the realm of epistemic planning, thereby laying the
ground work to study more complex interaction scenarios in-
cluding cases with more levels of nesting, uncertainty about
mental models, more expressive models, incorporating non-
deterministic effects, and so on. It would also be worth in-
vestigating specific considerations for choosing heuristics or
formulating new ones for such problems.
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